Twitter/X Corp 's legal challenge before the Karnataka High Court spotlights illegal take down orders being used as parallel process and a censorship portal

X Corp. (formerly Twitter) is challenging the government’s misuse of Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act to issue takedown orders, bypassing Section 69A safeguards. It also exposed ‘Sahyog,’ an illegal censorship portal.

tl;dr

X Corp. (formerly Twitter) has challenged the Central Government’s use of Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”) to issue takedown orders before the High Court of Karnataka as a bypass of the website blocking powers under Section 69A [W.P.(C) 7405 of 2025]. It has also spotlighted an illegal censorship portal called ‘Sahyog’ which is creating a parallel procedure for blocking content on a large scale. In this post, we explain the issues with the existing process, where the safe harbour framework is being turned into a censorship apparatus.

Background

X Corp. has filed a writ petition before the Karnataka High Court on 05.03.2025, challenging the Union Government’s unlawful extension of powers to issue blocking orders. The case primarily concerns the circumvention of Section 69A of the IT Act, and the Blocking Rules, 2009. X Corp. is stating that through the issuance of notifications by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (“MeitY”) under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, a parallel process for blocking content has been created without the procedural safeguards mandated by Section 69A. 

How is the illegal website blocking power under Section 79 worse than Section 69A?

Let's break down the technicalities of what this means. While website blocking orders under Section 69A have poor procedural safeguards, they still have some of them. Now, even those basic thresholds have been bypassed by MeitY, which has transformed the safe harbour framework under Section 79 into a censorship system on large-scale. This has been done through an office memorandum dated 31.10.2023, issued by MeitY which authorised government agencies to block content and even provided a ‘Template Blocking Order’ to these entities to facilitate censorship requests.

It is important to note that this is being done under Section 79 (safe harbour) rather than Section 69A (online content blocking) and, hence, will not follow any of the even minimal safeguards for website blocking. This is a further regression of legal standards that will increase secrecy and a lack of due process in online censorship. 

Safeguard

Section 69A (IT Act)

Section 79(3)(b) 

Legal Issue

Designated Officer Requirement

Yes – Blocking orders must be issued by a high-ranking Designated Officer (Joint Secretary or higher).

No – No centralized oversight, allowing diverse agencies including local police to issue blocking orders.

This safeguard is vital to prevent misuse of authority and maintain consistent oversight.

Written Justification for Blocking

Yes – Detailed reasons must be recorded in writing and are subject to judicial scrutiny. However, this is often not done in practice.

No – Orders can be issued without explicit written justification, making judicial oversight and challenge difficult.

Written justification enables judicial scrutiny; absence under Section 79(3)(b) obstructs transparency and accountability.

Pre-Decisional Hearing for Intermediary & Originator

Yes – Intermediaries and originators must be given notice and a chance to respond before blocking. However, this is often not done in practice.

No – No opportunity for intermediaries or content originators to be heard before blocking orders are executed.

The pre-decisional hearing safeguard under Section 69A aligns with principles of natural justice; its absence violates due process.

Review by Independent Committee

Yes – An independent Review Committee reviews all orders regularly (every two months).

No – Absence of any mandated review committee or independent oversight mechanism.

Regular independent review ensures ongoing validity and prevents misuse, a safeguard deemed essential by the Supreme Court.

Blocking Limited to Article 19(2) Grounds

Yes – Blocking is strictly restricted to clearly defined grounds under Article 19(2), e.g., national security, public order, etc.

No – Vaguely allows blocking for any broadly-defined 'unlawful act', leading to arbitrary and wide-ranging censorship.

Strict adherence to Article 19(2) ensures blocking is narrowly tailored; deviation under Section 79(3)(b) violates constitutional safeguards.

Limited Scope of Blocking Authority

Yes – Only the Central Government (via the Designated Officer) can issue orders; state entities cannot independently issue blocking orders.

No – Empowers multiple ministries, state governments, and even local police, vastly increasing censorship power.

Expanding blocking powers to multiple agencies dilutes responsibility, leading to widespread and uncontrolled censorship.

Emergency Blocking Review

Yes – Emergency blocking orders must undergo review within 48 hours to assess validity and necessity.

No – No mandatory review, allowing indefinite blocking without further checks.

Emergency review safeguards prevent indefinite censorship without accountability; its absence undermines due process.

Transparency and Confidentiality Requirements

Yes – Mandates confidentiality while ensuring transparency through oversight mechanisms and judicial accountability. In practice the Blocking Order is sometimes not even shared with the impacted user.

No – Lack of transparency or accountability, orders can be issued secretly without any mandated confidentiality or transparency procedures.

Transparency safeguards provide judicial and public accountability; the lack of transparency mechanisms under Section 79(3)(b) promotes secrecy and misuse.

Spotlight on ‘Sahyog’: Censorship at scale

The petition also brings attention to ‘Sahyog,’ created by the Ministry of Home Affairs (“MHA”), which is termed an illegal “censorship portal” in the petition. After MeitY issued the office memorandum in 2023, the MHA, the next year, on March 13, 2024, authorized the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (“I4C”) to act as the agency of the MHA to perform the functions under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act. Things only got progressively worse from there, as it started creating ‘Sahyog’. 

The public disclosure of ‘Sahyog’ first came through in the case of Shabana v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., W.P.(Crl) 1563 of 2024 (“Shabana”), where the High Court of Delhi, based on MHA’s submissions, highlighted the need for a mechanism that is “robust enough to facilitate a live interaction between intermediaries and the law enforcement agencies” to enable instantaneous action, especially in urgent cases. By order dated 28.10.2024 in Shabana, a division bench of the Delhi High Court emphasised the need for better coordination between social media platforms, telecom service providers, and law enforcement agencies.

On 11.12.2024, the MHA submitted before the Delhi High Court that it had developed ‘Sahyog’, a portal where authorised agencies of the central government, states, and union territories, as well as social media intermediaries can work together. According to the MHA, this platform will be the main platform on which all the authorised agencies of the central government, states, and union territories, social media intermediaries, and IT intermediaries will have joint access. They added that in the first phase of the portal, the focus has been on taking down unlawful content. According to the report submitted by the MHA to the court, in the second phase, the portal’s functionality will be extended to include lawful data requests and other similar submissions.  

It is pertinent to note that the High Court of Delhi has not adjudicated on its constitutionality and it was not questioned before it. 

There are several problems with the ‘Sahyog’ portal that will value speed of takedowns over the rights of free expression undermining Article 19(1)(a) which is explained in the table below: 

Issue

Description

Legal issues

Lack of Legal Authority

The ‘Sahyog’ Portal has no legal basis in the IT Act or any other law. Section 69A is the only legal provision for content blocking, and it mandates strict procedural safeguards. The government is misusing Section 79(3)(b) to justify the portal, which does not allow content blocking.

The portal is ultra vires (beyond legal authority) and violates the IT Act and Supreme Court precedent in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (“Shreya Singhal”).

Circumvention of Section 69A Safeguards

Section 69A provides procedural protections such as hearings, review committees, and written justifications. The ‘Sahyog’ Portal bypasses these safeguards, allowing authorities to issue blocking orders without due process.

The portal creates an unauthorized, parallel censorship system that undermines the IT Act and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shreya Singhal.

Unregulated Expansion of Blocking Powers

Section 69A limits blocking powers to a Designated Officer (Joint Secretary or higher). The ‘Sahyog’ Portal allows ministries, state governments, and even local police to issue blocking orders, leading to widespread, arbitrary censorship.

The decentralized, unchecked use of the portal leads to widespread and arbitrary censorship, violating Article 14 (equal protection of laws) and Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech).

Lack of Transparency & Accountability

Blocking orders issued through the portal are not made public. There is no clarity on who issues them, on what basis, and whether they are reviewed. This secrecy prevents intermediaries and users from challenging decisions.

Lack of transparency and accountability enables secret censorship, violating Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

No Opportunity to Challenge Blocking Orders

Under Section 69A, content providers and intermediaries must be given an opportunity to be heard before content is blocked. The ‘Sahyog’ Portal provides no such notice or opportunity for appeal.

Blocking content without prior notice or opportunity for appeal violates principles of natural justice and due process under Articles 14 and 21.

No Post-Decisional Review

Blocking orders issued via the ‘Sahyog’ Portal remain indefinitely without periodic review, unlike Section 69A, which requires regular oversight by a Review Committee.

Permanent blocking without review is unconstitutional and undermines judicial oversight, violating procedural safeguards mandated by the Supreme Court.

Forced Participation of Intermediaries

The MHA has demanded that X Corp. appoint a 'Nodal Officer' to comply with portal requests, even though this requirement has no legal basis in the IT Act. This forces private companies to comply with an unconstitutional system.

Forcing intermediaries to comply with an illegal censorship system amounts to coercion and an abuse of power.

Expands Censorship Beyond National Security Concerns

Section 69A allows blocking only for reasons listed in Article 19(2) (e.g., national security, public order). The ‘Sahyog’ Portal enables content blocking for vague and undefined 'unlawful acts,' potentially censoring dissent and journalism.

This overreach violates freedom of expression protections and facilitates arbitrary censorship without justification.

Violation of Supreme Court's Shreya Singhal Judgment

The Supreme Court upheld Section 69A as constitutional because it contained safeguards. The ‘Sahyog’ Portal ignores these safeguards, violating Shreya Singhal and Article 141 of the Constitution.

The government is defying a binding Supreme Court ruling, violating Article 141 of the Constitution.

Creates an Unchecked & Unregulated Censorship Regime

Blocking orders can be issued without judicial review, independent oversight, or transparency. This creates a censorship regime that operates beyond constitutional boundaries, violating Articles 14, 19, and 21.

This undermines fundamental rights, encourages abuse, and constitutes a colourable exercise of power (disguising an unconstitutional purpose as lawful action).

To know more about the current status of the ‘Sahyog’ portal, we filed a Right to Information application (“RTI”) with the MHA on 21.03.2025. We requested detailed financial information regarding the ‘Sahyog’ portal, and also asked for a copy of the tender, request for proposals, or other contracting documents related to its technical development. Additionally, we sought information on the authorized agencies with access to the ‘Sahyog’  portal, including those from the Central Government, States, and Union Territories. We also inquired about the IT intermediaries and social media platforms signed up for the portal. Lastly, we requested details on the number of notices issued through the portal, the actions taken, and the mechanism used to issue notices. 

Conclusion 

Portals such as ‘Sahyog’ which are made without any legal authorisation and checks while prioritizing the efficiency of takedown requests come with a direct injury to speech and expression. A large part of the issue emerges from the expansion of power provided under Section 79 of the IT Act, which is being used as a substitute for the blocking powers under Section 69A. It is resulting in illegal orders from departments and entities such as the Ministry of Railways resulting in a framework of opaque censorship orders that bypass the safeguards established by Shreya Singhal. This shows that MeitY, through other agencies, is attempting to achieve indirectly what it cannot do directly under Section 69A, as the latter includes safeguards and defenses reinforced by the Shreya Singhal. Towards this X Corp.’s petition in the Karnataka High Court is a required intervention to place checks and balances on web censorship in India. 

Important Documents

  1. Supreme Court’s decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (link)
  2. Delhi High Court order in Shabana v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors dated 28.10.2024 (link)
  3. Delhi High Court order in Shabana v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors dated 11.12.2024 (link)
  4. RTI application dated 21.03.2025 (link)

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